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Re-Defining National Security in the Technology Age:
The Encryption Export Debate
I. Introduction
The technological revolution of the past decade has transformed the global econ-
omy. With the end of the Cold War, the United States and other industrialized nations
have been able to re-direct significant portions of their economies away from defense
spending and focus more of their attention on economic growth and development. The
United States has encouraged its remarkable economic growth by reducing federal
regulations and by encouraging free market principles. As a result, the American econ-
omy has greatly expanded in the 1990s, especially in the technology sector where
America's leadership is unquestioned throughout the world.
Although the technological revolution has transformed the American economy, its
national security policies have yet to reflect the progressive trends of this revolution.
Traditional means of measuring a nation's strength, such as military power and natural
resources, have given way to the importance of a nation's ability to collect, process,
disseminate and protect information.' Establishing and maintaining America's techno-
logical dominance not only helps to deter or even prevent traditional military threats at a
relatively low cost, but it also plays a significant role in fighting international terrorism,
drug smuggling, and nuclear proliferation.2 In order to protect its technological secrets
and maintain its edge over other countries in acquiring and processing information, the
United States has turned to encryption technology.3 More specifically, encryption, the
ability to transform and store text into an unintelligible form, now assumes a central role
in continuing America's technological leadership and maintaining its national security.4
While encryption offers American industry a tremendous advantage in conducting
its business by ensuring that transactions and industrial secrets are kept safe, encryption
also offers many opportunities for misuse. Criminal activities that use encryption tech-
nology to their advantage, such as terrorism, organized crime, and industrial espionage
have prompted the federal government to enact strong laws regulating encryption in
order to prevent such misuse.5 Many have argued that as a result of these regulations,
America's lead in developing encryption technology has suffered by allowing foreign
competitors to secure market share through the diminished presence of American indus-
try in this area.6 By weakening a vital part of the country's technology sector, American
1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and William A. Owens, America's Information Edge, 75 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar. -
Apr. 1996, at 20, 20.
2. See id., at 20, 32.
3. Charles L. Evans, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts to Protect National Security
Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C.J. INTL L. & COM. REG.
469,470 (1994).
4. Christian R. White, Decrypting the Politics: Why the Clinton Administration's National Cryptography
Policy Will Continue to be Dictated by National Economic Interest, 7 CATH. U. COMM. L. CONsPEcTUS 193,
194 (1999).
5. E. Franklin Haignere, An Overview of the Issues Surrounding the Encryption Exportation Debate,
Their Ramifications, and Potential Resolution, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE, Fall 1998 - Winter 1999, at 319,
319.
6. See id., at 320.
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regulations, in their effort to promote economic growth and strengthen national security,
have actually damaged America's national security by hampering its technological
growth. American policy treats encryption as a means to promote national security in-
stead of an element of national security itself. This Note analyzes the legislative and
legal treatment of encryption technology exports in an attempt to formulate a new un-
derstanding of national security as the United States moves into the twenty-first century.
Furthermore, this Note acknowledges that although there have been significant attempts
to ease restrictions on the export of encryption technology in recent years, there remains
a strong need to create a national policy that balances both the security and economic
interests of the United States.
II. Evolution of Encryption Technology
Although the methods of encryption have changed, encryption technology itself has
existed for almost sixty years.7 In World War II, encryption by means of mechanical
devices, such as Germany's Enigma machines, was employed widely.8 In the 1960s,
mechanical encryption gave way to encryption performed by electronics and comput-
ers.9 Because of its military potential, the United States government enjoyed a virtual
monopoly on computer encryption until the 1970s, when IBM developed Lucifer, a
commercial encryption device.1° The primary purpose of Lucifer was cash-dispensing,
although additional applications, both commercial and military, were envisioned.' After
passing the government standards established by the National Bureau of Standards and
the National Security Agency (NSA), IBM's Lucifer system was entrusted to protect all
of the government's transmissions and storage of unclassified data and was certified as
the new Date Encryption Standard (DES). 12 Today, the American economy primarily
uses three encryption systems: DES, the original Lucifer system; RSA, named after its
three inventors: Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman; and the Digital Signature Standard
(DSS), developed jointly between the National Institute of Standards and Technology
and the NSA. 3
The utility of encryption rests on its ability to effectively protect the communication
and information of its users. Without encryption, confidential information could be "in-
tercepted or modified" by business competitors, or worse yet, by those willing to com-
mit fraud, and used to the detriment of businesses and those seeking to do business with
them. 14 Encryption prevents such adverse effects by applying a mathematical function,
called an algorithm, to scramble data and other communications. 15 The algorithm used
to unscramble, or decrypt, information is called the decryption key. 16 The strength of an
encryption algorithm is measured by the "length of its key, which is measured in-bits,
and the complexity of its algorithm."' 7 Each bit "doubles the number of possible key
7. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Mark B. Hartzler, National Security Export Controls on Data Encryption-How they Limit U.S.
Competitiveness, 29 TEX INT'L L.J. 437, 440 (1994).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 440-41.
13. See id. at 441.
14. Mai-Tram B. Dinh, Note, The U.S. Encryption Policy: Taking the Byte out of the Debate, 7 MINN. J.






sequences; thus, as the number of bits increases, the encryption becomes dramatically
stronger."'
18
Encryption technology is essential to the continued growth and success of electronic
commerce (e-commerce) and the internet. The success of encryption in the global mar-
ketplace is evidenced by the subsequent growth of encryption products. In addition to
the United States' encryption production, over 656 encryption products are manufac-
tured by companies in approximately thirty countries throughout the world.19 As a con-
sequence of encryption's success and widespread use, the United States is faced with the
challenge of balancing its need to compete economically by ensuring its encryption
products are widely available in foreign markets while at the same time protecting its
national security interests. The United States has enacted a series of regulations and
oversight mechanisms to meet this challenge. These very regulations are at the center of
the debate over whether or not strict controls on encryption exports actually increase
national security.
11. Encryption Regulation
The current debate over encryption focuses on the export of that technology. Current
regulations only affect exports and do not affect the "import, sale, [or] use of encryption
products within the United States., 20 The export of encryption technology is controlled
by the federal government under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).21 The
EAR was established to implement the provisions of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (EAA), which was designed to "control exports of technology ... which could
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any country or combination
of countries which would be detrimental to the national security of the United States. 22
The EAR defined "export" as "an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the
EAR out of the United States, or release of technology or software subject to the EAR to
a foreign national in the United States., 23 In order to determine which items and activi-
ties fall under the EAR, one must consult the Commerce Control List (CCL).24 As of
March 1998, the CCL included over 200 sub-categories of controlled items and ap-
proximately 100,000 specific items.2 5 Activities which fall under the EAR include en-
cryption of commodities, software, and any technology with encryption features.26
In the past, the Department of State regulated encryption exports based on the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)27 and the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR).25 Central to the Department of State's review was the United
States Munitions List (USML),2 9 which classified encryption products as munitions,
18. Id. at 379-80, explaining that a "40-bit key allows more than a trillion possible combinations, while a
56-bit key allows more than 72 quadrillion possible combinations." Id. at 380. ("A skilled hacker can break the
code for a 40-bit encryption key in about forty seconds.., a 56-bit key require[s] 120 days to be broken, even
with the power of a nationwide group of network computers. Today's fastest computers would require millions
of years to descramble even stronger versions of encryption software.") Id. at 392.
19. F. Lynn McNulty, Encryption's Importance to Economic and Infrastructure Security, 9 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 427,428-29 (1999). See also, Dinh, supra note 14.
20. Haignere, supra note 5, at 320.
21. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-40 (1999).
22. 50 U.S.C. §2401 (1994).
23. 15 C.F.R. §734.2(b)(1) (1999).
24. 15 C.F.R. §734.2(a)(1) (1999).
25. White, supra note 4, at 197.
26. Haignere, supra note 5, at 321.
27. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994).
28. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (1999).
29. United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, category XIII(b)(l) (1999).
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thereby justifying government control over this technology.30 Encryption software was
included in the USML because of its capability to "maintain the secrecy or confidential-
ity of information or information systems.",3 1 Critics of the USML question its rigidity in
failing to differentiate between encryption software used solely for military purposes
and dual-use encryption software used by businesses and private citizens. 32 President
Clinton's Executive Order 13,026, released on November 15, 1996, transferred the ju-
risdiction over dual-use software encryption software from the Department of State to
both the Department of Commerce and the Department of State's Office of Defense
Trade Control.33
The activities of the EAR are currently subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Export Administration (BXA).34 One of the BXA's primary functions is to regulate
dual-use encryption software and place such software on the CCL.35 After the Depart-
ment of Commerce processes the application of the potential encryption exporter, the
BXA then reviews it to determine whether or not export or re-export is consistent with
U.S. national security interests.36 Prior to September 1999, any individual or company
seeking to export encryption technology over 56-bits in strength has to submit a license
application to the Department of Commerce.37 The Department of Commerce and the
BXA thus play the central role of determining which U.S. encryption products are made
available to foreign customers.
A. The United States Encryption Export Regime
Critics of strict regulations on encryption exports believe that these regulations go
too far, serving neither economic nor national security interests. The first real public
debate on encryption arose in 1993 over the Clinton Administration's key escrow-based
Clipper chip proposal.38 This proposal would have required every computer to contain
an encryption key allowing the government access to any encrypted data. 39 The public
outcry over seemingly endless government access to private information doomed this
proposal, however. 40 Over the next few years, the Clinton Administration moved toward
a more reasonable policy that emphasized the common interests of the government and
the business sector on the issue of encryption. 41 By 1996, however, the software industry
was restless for a modification of existing American law on encryption. Many encryp-
tion exporters argued in 1996 that "the pre-packaged software industry was estimated to
be worth $109.3 billion and [was] expected to double to $221.9 billion by the year
2 0 0 2 ."
42 Some analysts argued that current American encryption policies were costing
U.S. companies an estimated $60 billion every year in lost revenue because international
companies are allowed to export much stronger encryption technology than their Ameri-
can counterparts.43 Until recently, U.S. companies could export 40-bit strength encryp-
30. Hartzler, supra note 10, at 444.
31. Id.
32. White, supra note 4, at 196.
33. See id.
34. See Haignere, supra note 5, at 320.
35. See 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1 (1999).
36. See id.
37. See Haignere, supra note 5, at 321. See infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
38. McNulty, supra note 19, at 431.
39. See id at 432.
40. See id. at 431-32.
41. See id. at432.
42. White, supra note 4, at 201.
43. See id. See also infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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tion software with limited restrictions while their foreign competitors were allowed to
export 128-bit strength encryption technology. 44 The loss of revenue and the growing
unattractiveness of American encryption products threatened the loss of American com-
petitiveness throughout the world.
The Clinton Administration has enacted a series of recent measures aimed at re-
forming the regulation of encryption exports. On May 8, 1997, the Clinton Administra-
tion changed its encryption policy relating to banks and financial institutions by allow-
ing them to use the most powerful encryption technology without the use of a key re-
covery system.45 In September 1998, Vice President Al Gore announced another shift in
American encryption export policy on the issue of licensing requirements.46 The policy
called for the government, after a one-time review, to allow the mass marketing of 56-
bit encryption technology, as opposed to the previously regulated 40-bit strength en-
cryption products.47 In addition, the Administration's new policy eliminated the re-
quirement that companies create and implement a key recovery system. This means that
companies that choose not to export key recovery technology no longer need to report
information to a key recovery agent.
48
With a growing number of countries producing and exporting sensitive encryption
technology abroad, the Clinton Administration turned its attentions to creating an inter-
national regime on encryption controls. The NSA and the State Department in the past
have consistently cited the dangers inherent in exporting encryption, including use by
terrorists to facilitate attacks on American interests abroad.49 Therefore, for any encryp-
tion export policy to be effective, the United States must gain the regulatory support of
its allies and the major industrialized countries. The first attempt by the United States to
rally international support to limit the export of sensitive technology like encryption
came in 1949 with the formation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM), formed in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).5 ° COCOM was designed to coordinate the export policies of its members and
provide oversight for exports to suspect nations in an effort to form a more cohesive
export regime.5'
In an effort to refocus its allies' interests on the importance of limiting the export of
encryption technology to rogue states, the Clinton Administration sought to establish a
new COCOM for the next century in the form of the Wassenaar Agreement in Decem-
ber 1998.52 The Wassenaar Agreement was formed by thirty-three industrialized nations
with the specific goal of restricting exports of military and military-civilian "dual-use"
technology to renegade countries such as Libya, Iran, and North Korea.53 The Was-
senaar group's Dual-Use Control List extended to encryption products using over 56-
bits, including "web browsers, e-mail applications, e-commerce servers, and telephone
scrambling devices., 54 In addition, the Wassenaar countries agreed to improve their
44. See id. See also infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
45. White, supra note 4, at 200.
46. McNulty, supra note 19, at 433.
47. White, supra note 4, at 200.
48. See id. at 200-01.
49. See id. at 198.
50. Hartzler, supra note 10, at 442 (COCOM's current members include Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
51. See id.





national controls on the export of encryption products with strengths over 64-bits, which
applied to items such as personal computers and data base programs.55
Although the Wassenaar Agreement did ensure the free flow of encryption products
under 56-bit, many critics, in the United States and abroad, point out that restricting the
export of encryption products violates free speech rights. More specifically, they claim
that the Wassenaar restrictions violate international protections against arbitrary inter-
ference with individual privacy and the free expression of ideas. Anticipating Was-
senaar's new restrictions, in September 1998, Human Rights Watch criticized the pro-
posed agreement by warning that coded language communications are protected as a
right of free expression under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
to which most members of the Wassenaar are parties.56 The efforts of Human Rights
Watch highlight the complexity of the encryption export debate both in the United
States and abroad.
B. American Courts on Encryption
American courts are sharply divided over whether or not regulating the export of en-
cryption products is a violation of the law. Three cases in particular, Karn v. United
States Department of State,57 Bernstein v. United States Department of State,58 and
Junger v. Daley59 all highlight the current confusion in the courts and the industry over
what constitutes a violation of America's encryption export policy. The failure of these
courts to reach a consensus reflects the complexity of the issue and the embryonic state
of American law on the regulation of encryption exports.
1. Karn v. United States Department of State
The dispute in Karn arose when the State Department classified the plaintiff s com-
puter diskette "as a 'defense article' pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 6 ° In February 1994, plain-
tiff, Philip R. Karn, Jr., submitted a commodity jurisdiction request to the State Depart-
ment for Bruce Schneier's book, Applied Cryptography, which contained information on
encryption protocols, techniques, and algorithms.6 On March 2, 1994, the State De-
partment's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) "determined that the book [was]
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of State pursuant to the ITAR,, 62 al-
though this determination did not extend to two diskettes containing an encryption
source code discussed in Applied Cryptography.63 Mr. Karn submitted an additional
commodity jurisdiction request just one week later for the diskette; the request was soon
rejected on the basis that the diskette was "subject to the jurisdiction of the Department
of State pursuant to the ITAR and the AECA because the diskette 'is designated as a
defense article under category XIII(b)(1) of the United States Munitions List.
''64
55. See id. The Wassenaar Agreement is discussed at length infra p. 26
56. See id. at 436.
57. 925 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996).
58. 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
59. 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
60. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 2.
61. See id. at 3.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 4.
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The primary contention by the plaintiff in Karn was that the State Department's
regulation of the diskettes constituted "a restraint on free speech in violation of [his]
First Amendment rights., 65 More specifically the plaintiff argued that:
the diskette should be considered 'speech' for the purpose of First Amendment
analysis because the computer language source codes contained on the diskette are
comprehensible to human beings when viewed on a personal computer, because the
diskette contains 'comments' interspersed throughout the source code which are use-
ful only to a human and are ignored by the computer, and because the source ode and
comments taken together teach humans how to speak in code.
66
In rejecting Karn's First Amendment complaint, the court based its decision on the need
of the federal government to regulate items which have national security implications.
The court held that the regulation of Kam's diskettes was content-neutral and capable of
regulation by the government as long as other criteria were met, as opposed to content-
specific, which would bar government regulation of such materials. 67 The additional
criteria include "whether the regulation is (1) within the constitutional power of the
government, (2) 'furthers an important or substantial government interest,' and (3) is
narrowly tailored to the government interest." 68 The court reasoned that the government
regulation of Kam's diskettes passed the O'Brien Test because by "placing crypto-
graphic products on the ITAR, the President has determined that the proliferation of
cryptographic products will harm the United States., 69 Furthermore, the court was re-
luctant to question the President's foreign policy decision on encryption or to define
American national security interests, which are the exclusive province of the executive
and legislative branches of government.
70
2. Junger v. Daley
Junger v. Daley further supported government regulation of encryption exports. In
this case, the plaintiff, Peter Junger, was a law professor at Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity Law School in Ohio and taught a class entitled "Computers and the Law."' On
June 12, 1997, Professor Junger submitted three applications to the Department of
Commerce in order to receive a commodity classification for several encryption soft-
ware programs and other items he needed as part of his class materials. 72 Professor
Junger was notified by the Bureau of Export Administration on July 4, 1997 "that Ex-
port Classification Number 5D002 covered four of the five software programs he had
submitted, and therefore were subject to the Export Regulations. '73 Despite the limita-
tions imposed on the export of his software programs, Professor Junger was allowed to
export the chapter in his textbook, Computers and the Law, which pertained to encryp-
tion.74 The Department of Commerce decided that the chapter of his book on encryption
65. Id. at 9.
66. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 9.
67. See id. at 10.
68. Id. This test is also known as the "O'Brien Test" established in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
69. Id. at 11.
70. See id. at 11-12.
71. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 713.





code was free for export but that if he wanted to export his software programs, Professor
Junger would first have to seek a license for those items.75
Professor Junger filed suit in October, 1997 against William Daley, the Secretary for
the Department of Commerce, claiming the Export Regulations violated his First
Amendment right to free speech. In deciding whether or not the Export Regulations
constituted a violation of Junger's free speech, the court had to determine whether the
export of encryption code was "expressive, and whether the Export Regulation [was]
directed at the content of ideas. 76 The U.S. District Court, in ruling that the content of
Professor Junger's encryption software was not expressive, held that:
Among computer software programs, encryption software is especially functional
rather than expressive. Like much computer software, encryption source code is in-
herently functional; it is designed to enable a computer to do a designed task. En-
cryption source code does not merely explain a cryptographic theory or describe how
the software functions. More than describing encryption, the software carries out the
function of encryption. The software is essential to carry out the function of encryp-
tion. In doing this function, the encryption software is indistinguishable from dedi-
cated computer hardware that does encryption. In the overwhelming majority of cir-
cumstances, encryption source code is exported to transfer functions, not to commu-
nicate ideas.77
The court went on to reason that although exporting source code "occasionally" 78 has
communicative elements, that remains insufficient to extend the protections of the First
Amendment to it. The court's reasoning suggests that had the encryption software been
found to communicate ideas, application of the Export Regulations would be unconsti-
tutional under the First Amendment. Junger, therefore, supported the Export Regula-
tions of encryption software because source code is inherently functional, such regula-
tions are not directed at the expressive elements of source code, and Professor Junger
still was able to export the printed form of this information.79
3. Bernstein v. United States Department of State
Despite the rulings in Karn and Junger, the American judiciary remains divided on the
constitutionality of regulating encryption technology and its implications on the First
Amendment guarantee to free speech. Bernstein v. United States Department of State,
which was decided after Karn but before Junger, took the other side of the issue and
favored First Amendment protection of encryption technology exports. Bernstein serves
as a reminder not only of the courts' split on the issue of First Amendment protection for
encryption exports, but also on the need for legislative reform on this issue.
While a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley, Daniel Bern-
stein developed an encryption algorithm called "Snuffle." 80 Mr. Bernstein expressed this
algorithm in an academic paper entitled "The Snuffle Encryption System" and in source
code written in "C," a type of computer programming language. 81 In 1992, Mr. Bern-
stein submitted a commodity jurisdiction request to the State Department to determine
whether his Snuffle program and related encryption items were subject to the ITAR.
82
75. See id.
76. Id. at 715.
77. Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
78. Id. at 717.
79. Haignere, supra note 5, at 330.





The Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) determined that the Snuffle program was
a defense article on the USML under Category XIII of the ITAR and subject to export
licensing regulations.
8 3
Mr. Bernstein filed his action based on the ODTC's determination that his Snuffle
program was a defense article under the USML. Specifically, Mr. Bernstein believed
that the regulations of the ITAR and the AECA violated his First Amendment rights by
limiting his freedom to teach, publish, or discuss with other scientists his research on
encryption. 84 Also, Mr. Bernstein contended that the EAR and the regulations on en-
cryption items, not only restrained his free speech, but were unconstitutionally vague
and over-broad, content-based, and a violation of his freedom of association.85 The court
in Bernstein acknowledged that governments may impose certain restrictions on materi-
als that are "content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental inter-
est, and leave open alternative channels for communication. 8 6 Because the court had
already determined in previous decisions that source code constituted expressive activ-
ity, it turned its attention to the licensing procedure used by the Department of Com-
merce.8 7 The court relied on Freedman v. Maryland,8 8 which held that in order for a
licensing regime to be constitutional, "1) the licensor must make the licensing decision
within a specific and reasonable period of time; 2) there must be prompt judicial review;
and 3) the censor must bear the burden of going to court to uphold a licensing denial and
once there bears the burden of justifying the denial. '89 In finding that the export restric-
tions on Mr. Bernstein's encryption software were unconstitutional, the court reasoned:
This court has stated previously that while it is mindful of the problems inherentin
judicial review of licensing decisions regarding cryptographic software, both withre-
spect to the sophistication of the technology and the potentially classified natureof
the licensing considerations, there must still be some review available if the export-
controls on cryptographic software are to survive the presumption against prior re-
straintson speech. In this case.., the court concludes that the encryption regulations
are an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. 9°
The Bernstein decision, when considered with Karn and Junger, highlight the need for
the government to balance the interests of free speech and national security. They also
demonstrate that current federal regulations must be revised in order to effectively ad-
dress these issues and formulate a stronger encryption export policy.
IV. Creating a Stronger Encryption Export Policy
In order to create a more effective encryption export regime, American encryption
policy should acknowledge the interrelationship between economic and national security
interests. Limiting the enforcement of encryption regulations to the United States will do
little to deter terrorists or criminals from using encryption as long as those individuals
can obtain such material from other industrialized nations. Furthermore, allowing a rigid
encryption export regime punishes American companies because as these companies
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 1296.
86. Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1303.
87. Haignere, supra note 5, at 334 (citing Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 922 F.Supp.
1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996)(Bernstein I) and Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 945 F.Supp. 1279
(N.D. Cal. 1996)(Bernstein 11).
88. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).




comply with tight regulations, their foreign competitors gain market share at their ex-
pense. Such a result not only denies American companies potential profits but also
threatens the competitiveness of the encryption industry. This challenge calls for leader-
ship by the United States government in working with other countries to meet the shared
threats of international crime and terrorism. Enhanced international cooperation along
with domestic regulatory reform will strengthen the United States' encryption industry.
and in doing so, further American security interests.
A. Domestic Encryption Regulation Reform
The first step in creating an effective and lasting encryption export regime starts
with the creation of adequate domestic regulations. U.S. laws addressing encryption so
far have created confusion and have drawn fire from various groups for either favoring
economic interests too much or not doing enough to safeguard national security inter-
ests. One piece of legislation currently before Congress is the Security and Freedom
Through Encryption (SAFE) Act of 1999,9' which makes significant progress in ad-
dressing the concerns of the various parties to the encryption debate.92 The SAFE Act
represents an attempt to weigh the desires of the encryption industry to liberalize the
export of its products with the interests of national security in fighting international
terrorism, espionage and domestic criminal acts. Although by no means a panacea, the
framework of the SAFE Act addresses the encryption concerns of today while making
future reform possible as the encryption industry grows and new challenges to Amer-
ica's national security emerge.
1. Law Enforcement
In a move to appease the encryption industry, President Clinton announced a new
policy on September 16, 1999 that would "dramatically ease restrictions on overseas
sales of sophisticated encryption products [and] the technology that scrambles electronic
data so it cannot be read without authorization..., This statement drew criticism from
law enforcement officials within the government and throughout the country. Attorney
General Janet Reno warned that "the policy the administration is announcing today will
result in greater availability of encryption, which will mean that more criminals and
terrorists will use encryption. 94 The opinions expressed by Attorney General Reno and
others showed a genuine fear that without adequate controls on the export of encryption
technology, the ability of law enforcement officials to capture and prosecute criminals
and terrorists will be greatly reduced.95
91. H.R. 850, 106a Cong. (1999).
92. See Haignere, supra note 5, at 346. The original SAFE Act, known as H.R. 695, was introduced in
1997 but stalled in committee. See id. H.R. 695 would have eliminated all restrictions on the use of encryption
software by citizens in the United States, placed oversight of encryption exports with the Department of
Commerce, allowed for the export of encryption products that were widely available overseas and the use of
encryption software to further a criminal act illegal. See id.
93. Jonathan Rabinovitz, U.S. Encryption Limits to be Eased, SILICON VALLEY NEWS, 2 (Sept. 15, 1999)
<http://www.mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/indepth/docs/encO91699.htm..> President Clinton's policy con-
sisted of three pillars: providing the Department of Defense $500 million over several years to improve its
information security, easing the export license restrictions on keys of 128 bits or more, and the introduction of
legislation aimed at improving America's law enforcement methods in dealing with encrypted messages. See
id. at B 10-12..
94. David Wilson, Encryption in Crossfire, SILICON VALLEY NEWS, 3 (Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.
mercurycenter.comlsvtech/news/indepth/docs/enc091799.htm.>
95. See White, supra note 4, at 198 (referring to the Aldrich Aimes and Ramzi Yousef cases as examples
of criminals who have used encryption technology to hide their criminal activity and avoid prosecution).
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The SAFE Act addresses many of the concerns presented by Attorney General Reno
and others in law enforcement. In an effort to clarify the penalties for those using en-
cryption technology in furtherance of their criminal behavior, the Act amends title 18,
§2805 of the United States Code to include:
Any person who, in the commission of a felony under a criminal statute of the
United States, knowingly and willfully encrypts incriminating communications or in-
formation relating to that felony with the intent to conceal such communications or
information for the purpose of avoiding detection by law enforcement agencies or
prosecution (1) in the case of a first offense under this section, shall be imprisoned
for not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both; and
(2) in the case of a second or subsequent offense under this section, shall be impris-
oned for not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or
both.96
The Act also provides the Attorney General and law enforcement officials with addi-
tional powers with which to monitor criminal activities. The Act provides that "[t]he
Attorney General shall compile, and maintain in classified form, data on the instances in
which encryption has interfered with, impeded, or obstructed the ability of the Depart-
ment of Justice to enforce the criminal laws of the United States. '97 Strengthening the
.hand of law enforcement has become even more important in the wake of recent attacks
on internet business. The recent success of hackers in disabling the websites of Yahoo!,
Buy.com, eBay, Amazon.com and CNN.com highlights the need not only for tougher
sentencing for criminals who use encryption to commit and hide their illegal activity,
but also for more sophisticated measures to prevent these crimes from occurring in the
first place.
2. Protecting the Encryption Industry
On the opposite side of the debate is the encryption industry, which maintains that
restrictions on the export of encryption technology do more harm to vital national inter-
ests than terrorists or criminals ever could. Many of America's software companies
believe that the "demand for information security is increasing so rapidly and becoming
so widespread that American companies stand to lose billions in annual revenue and
tens of thousands of jobs" if strict encryption export controls remain in place.98 These
fears were substantiated by a 1998 report issued by the Economic Strategies Institute
(ESI) which stated that the U.S. economy stood to lose upwards of $97 billion over the
next five years as a result of current encryption export regulations.99 ESI's report esti-
mated that American companies could lose an additional $140 billion in overseas sales
because foreign buyers would shy away from American software and other products that
were not protected by adequate encryption measures.100 The current encryption export
regime thus leaves the industry in the United States with two options: (1) lose market
share to foreign competitors or (2) develop two versions of their encryption software,
one of domestic use and one for export. The pitfalls of the second option are clear when
one considers that encryption developers would essentially have to develop two differ-
ent products, leading to a tremendous drain on their financial resources.01 Companies
96. H.R. 850, 106'b Cong. § 2 (1999) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2805).
97. H.R. 850, 106th Cong. § 4 (1999).
98. Evans, supra note 3, at 489 (citing Bob Violino, Gore Rebuffs Software Industry, INFORMATIONWEEK,
Feb. 7, 1994, at 15).
99. See McNulty, supra note 19, at 444.
100. See id.
101. See Evans, supra note 3, at 489-90.
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which could not afford to develop two versions of their encryption software would have
to either limit themselves to domestic sales and deny themselves foreign market share or
export the "weaker" version and be noncompetitive in foreign markets.
1 0 2
The recent initiatives of President Clinton and the provisions of the SAFE Act take
steps towards protecting the American encryption industry. President Clinton's Septem-
ber 1999 address signaling an easing of export limitations on encryption products should
provide a financial boost to leading encryption companies and promote more uniformity
throughout the entire e-commerce industry. 10 3 The SAFE Act has also brought its own
set of benefits to the encryption industry when it amended the Export Administration
Act of 19791°4 by overhauling its licensing regime and introducing clearer standards of
when companies can and cannot export encryption technology. According to the SAFE
Act, no export license is required:
[a]fter a one-time technical review by the Secretary of not more than 30 working
days, which shall include consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence ... except
pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Powers
Act. 105
This provision applies to:
Any computer hardware or software or computing device, including computer hard-
ware or software or computing devices with encryption capabilities that is generally
available; that is in the public domain for which copyright or other protection is not
available under tile 17, United States Code, or that is available to the public because
it is generally accessible to the interested public in any form; or that is used in a
commercial, off-the-shelf, consumer product or any component or subassembly de-
signed for use in such a consumer product available within the United States or
abroad which includes encryption capabilities which are inaccessible to the end user;




The SAFE Act also clarifies the rules on when exporting is not permitted. These restric-
tions will apply when there is:
substantial evidence that such computer hardware or software or computing devices
will be diverted to a military end use or an end use supporting international terror-
ism; modified for military or terrorist end use; reexported without any authorization
by the United States that may be required under this Act; or (1) harmful to the na-
tional security of the United States, including capabilities of the United States in
fighting drug trafficking, terrorism, or espionage, (2) used in illegal activities in-
volving the sexual exploitation of, abuse of, or sexually explicit conduct with minors,
or (3) used in illegal activities involving organized crime.1
°7
Such provisions should provide some guidance to potential encryption exporters and
eliminate some confusion in this area of the law.
Another move that would ease restrictions on the export of certain encryption soft-
ware would be to reform the United States Munitions List and streamline departmental
oversight of encryption exports. One of the main failings of the USML is its failure to
102. See id.
103. See Rabinovitz, supra note 93, at 14.
104. 50 U.S.C. §2416 (1979).





adequately resolve the problem of dual-use technologies. 0 8 Current regulations author-
ize the President to "control the import and the export of defense articles and defense
services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved
in the export and import of such articles and services."'1 9 The chief complaint of the
encryption industry in the United States is the categorization of their products as either
defense articles or defense services. 1 0 The inclusion of "cryptographic systems""'
alongside items such as bombs,1 2 grenades,1 3 tanks,114 and ballistic missiles' 15 suggests
the need to rethink what kind of national security threat encryption software presents.16
Passage of the SAFE Act and reform of the USML would address many of the con-
cerns of the encryption industry in the United States by simplifying the licensing process
for encryption software, establishing clear export criteria for companies and making
special provisions for dual-use encryption technology. The question of when to export
encryption technology, however, cannot be resolved by presidential policy speeches and
House bills. There is a very real and pressing need in the wake of recent internet "pi-
racy" and the growing role of high technology in our everyday lives to redefine national
security as the United States moves into the twenty-first century. A country's position in
the international arena is no longer measured by how much military power it can bring
to a field of battle or how many strategic assets it possesses. 17 Today, -America's
strength is judged by numerous economic factors including industrial production, eco-
nomic growth, unemployment, and the success of the stock market.
3. Defining the "New" National Security Policy
The dynamics of a global economy call for new leadership on the question of en-
cryption technology which recognizes that protecting the competitiveness of American
business is just as important as the ability to deploy military forces abroad. Internet pi-
racy and the damage it does to corporate networks and e-commerce is a relatively new
byproduct of the technology age and should serve as a wake-up call to the politicians of
America to recognize that the well-being of America's business interests is the emerging
national security priority of the twenty-first century. Furthermore, current encryption
export restrictions pose a danger to the security of the internet. The Internet Architecture
Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), two of the interna-
tional groups responsible for "technical management and standards development" for
the internet, have warned that current American encryption policy makes the internet
vulnerable to criminal assaults on electronic commerce. 8 The JAB and the IESG also
108. See White, supra note 4, at 196.
109. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1999).
110. See Evans, supra note 3, at 477-78.
111. 22 C.F.R. §121.1 Category XHI(b)(1) (1993).
112. See id. § 121.1 Category IV(a).
113. See id.
114. See id. §121.1 Category VII(a).
115. See id. §121.1 Category IV(b).
116. Evans, supra note 3, at 477. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category Xtll(b)-(b)(1) includes "military information
security systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, software, and components specifically designed or
modified therefor (i.e., such items when specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted or modified for
military applications (including command, control and intelligence applications)). This includes: (1) military
cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits,
components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or
information systems, including equipment and software for tracking, telemetry and control (TT&C) encryption
and decryption."
117. See Nye and Owens, supra note 1, at 20.
118. McNulty, supra note 19, at 448.
20001
Journal of Legislation
said that American encryption export restrictions will hurt developing countries that lack
the financial and technical resources to develop their own encryption software. l 9 The
proposed $2 billion for Fiscal Year 2001 for cyber-security by the Clinton Administra-
tion is a start but is still woefully inadequate to the task of protecting America's eco-
nomic interests.12
0
Encryption plays a central role in strengthening America's economic interests
against cyber threats. Improving America's laws and providing additional funding, how-
ever, will prove fruitless in addressing these threats if the United States is unable to
obtain cooperation from countries around the world. Although the United States has
more to lose from internet piracy now due primarily to the widespread use of the inter-
net throughout American society, threats to e-commerce will eventually impact the en-
tire international community and threaten the growth of the world economy. Any en-
cryption strategy, therefore, must take into consideration the importance of international
cooperation in any solution to information security.
B. International Encryption Oversight and Cooperation
The encryption export policies of the United States during the Cold War reflected its
economic, political and military preeminence. In an effort to create a liberal interna-
tional economic regime which protected its national security interests, the United States
passed the Export Control Act of 1949 (ECA).121 The ECA provided the President with
the powers to "prohibit the commercial export of articles, materials, or supplies, includ-
ing technical data, to nations unfriendly to the United States. ' 122 As long as the Soviet
military threat lingered, America's allies in Europe and Asia were willing to follow its
lead. Since the end of the Cold War, however, America's traditional allies have little to
gain by following America's notions of national security. These allies now see organi-
zations such as COCOM and other international regimes driven by the United States as
tools of furthering American dominance in an emerging technology sector. Today, the
challenge to America's leaders is to convince industrialized nations that there are threats
to global security, not just American national security. America's efforts to enforce strict
encryption export controls will have limited success without the cooperation of the in-
ternational community.
Over the past decade, the United States has had mixed success in building a consen-
sus among the international community on the issue of encryption export regulations.
One of the most serious blows to American encryption policy came on October 8, 1997
from the European Commission (EC), which regulates the trade of the fifteen members
of the European Union (EU) 1)23 The EC announced that it would not join an American
ban on certain encryption exports, citing the potential that such an action would stifle
the growth of e-commerce and would be difficult to enforce. 124 The EC's refusal to fol-
low America's lead on encryption export regulations is evidence of the changing atmos-
phere following the Cold War. Today, countries do not see America's global economic
and political power as a reason to follow the American lead, but rather, they view it as a
challenge to compete more robustly in the international marketplace.
119. See id.
120. See Clinton to Meet Internet Leaders on Cyber Threats, REUTERS, (Feb. 11, 2000), <http://www.
mercurycenter.com/svtech/news/breaking/merc/docs/007585.htm.>
121. See Hartzler, supra note 10, at 441.
122. Id.
123. See Dinh, supra note 14, at 389.
124. See id. at 389-90. The EC reasoned that joining a strict encryption export regime would hurt the
development of this emerging market. See id.
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Some progress was achieved in the area of encryption export regulation with the
Wassenaar Agreement in December 1998.125 Wassenaar was able to bring thirty three
industrial nations together and agree to bans on the export of dual-use technologies to
rogue states which included the export of 56-bit encryption keys. 126 The momentum
gained by Wassenaar was lost the following month, however, when one of its member
countries, France, announced it was dropping all controls on encryption technology up
to 128-bits. 127 In raising its export threshold from 40-bits to 128-bits, the French gov-
emnment cited its desire to improve the ability of its citizens to protect their confidential
communications and its wish to remove obstacles to the growth of e-commerce1 28 The
French government's announcement highlights resistance to American encryption ex-
port regulations not just in France, but throughout the international community, forcing
the United States to rethink its encryption priorities and develop a new strategy.
President Clinton's September 1999 policy initiative easing export license restric-
tions on encryption keys with at least 128-bit strength suggests a policy in which the
United States joins other countries in exporting stronger encryption products in an at-
tempt to influence the export policies of those countries. In many ways, the United
States encryption software industry is a victim of its own success. Countries perceive
America's initiatives on regulating encryption exports as a means of perpetuating
American dominance in this industry. It is easy to understand that in the absence of any
real security threat, America's allies would risk this technology falling into the hands of
terrorists or criminals if it meant a chance for them to cut into America's dominance in
the encryption market. Despite the vociferous complaints of the American encryption
industry over U.S. policy, recent information suggests that the encryption industry has
not lost any real market share to foreign competitors in the 1990s despite relatively
strong export controls. 29 Furthermore, the Clinton Administration has not perceived a
threat from foreign competition in the encryption industry mainly because "[t]he mere
fact that other countries produce encryption programs of some strength does not prove
that they can capably compete with U.S. manufacturers with respect to the strong tech-
nologies addressed in the Administration's regulations."'
' 30
With this in mind, the reasons behind President Clinton's September 1999 encryp-
tion policy announcement become less clear. If the Administration is not concerned with
foreign competition, what, then, is the policy objective behind the September 1999 pol-
icy statement? There are several likely reasons behind the Administration's recent pol-
icy shift. First, if the United States has a majority of the market share for encryption
products, liberalizing U.S. licensing regulations would help American industry maintain
their industry-wide lead that much more. Second, President Clinton's policy speech
recognizes the fact that the technology in this field is progressing much faster than the
law regulating it. American corporations are already protecting their business informa-
tion with software exceeding 128-bits, and more businesses in the United States and
throughout the world can be expected to move past this level of data protection. Third,
by easing the restrictions on the export of encryption technology, the United States has
placed itself in a better position to work with other countries in establishing an effective
encryption export regime.
125. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
126. See McNulty, supra notes 51-54.
127. See id. at 441.
128. See id.
129. See Dinh, supra note 14, at 391 (citing Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure
and National Security, 21 FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 81, 88 (1997)(explaining that of the more than 1000
encryption products manufactured throughout the world, only 435 were not produced in the United States).
130. Dinh, supra note 14, at 391-92.
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The problem with creating an effective system of regulating encryption exports
throughout the world is that countries have been unwilling to coordinate their national
policies in this area. One of the primary reasons for this is the fact that approximately
thirty nations manufacture encryption products and most of the encryption industries in
these countries are just in their infancy, making plans of global regulation a very diffi-
cult sell. As the encryption industries in these countries mature and the use of encryption
software becomes more widespread, America's concerns over criminal use of encryption
and internet terrorism will eventually be acknowledged and shared throughout the
world.
Instead of trying to promote encryption regulation unilaterally, the United States
should work within existing international regimes such as Wassenaar or the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Both Wassenaar and the WTO have institutional machinery
already in place to provide the framework for creating a more lasting encryption export
regime. A multilateral approach to the encryption export debate would have the effect of
coordinating international policy by expanding the scope of encryption regulation while
reducing the incentive of individual nations to pursue their own encryption policies. A
unilateral approach by individual nations would be detrimental to the international
community and global information security.
V. Conclusion
The United States is at a crossroads in defining its national security interests as it
moves into the twenty-first century. The absence of a clear geopolitical rival, however,
does not mean that the United States is without challenges to its national interests. In-
deed, the past decade has given rise to a global economy in which countries once bound
together in common defense during the Cold War now find themselves competing with
one another for global market share. Today, protecting American industry and economic
growth has become as important as maintaining its military strength.
America's encryption export policy is caught in the middle of this transformation of
America's national security priorities. Since World War II, the United States has favored
tight controls on the export of encryption technology in an effort to limit the access of
Soviet-bloc nations to this resource. With the Cold War over, America's controls on
encryption exports still remain in the form of strict licensing requirements and simplistic
categorization of encryption products as defense articles. 131 The main reason for this is
the failure to understand encryption, not as a threat, but as a vital part of America's na-
tional security as it moves into the next century. Encryption products are vital to the
security of information passed on the internet and business networks and play an im-
portant role in the expansion of the global economy. Protecting American industry has
emerged as the new American national security interest in a competitive global market
place. Encouraging the encryption industry by revising America's export policies of this
technology is an integral part of protecting this aspect of our national security.
The solution to the encryption export debate is based on legislative action and inter-
national cooperation. The desire to encourage the encryption industry and its role in
protecting American commerce across the globe should be considered in conjunction
with the concern of its misuse in furtherance of terrorist or criminal acts. The SAFE Act
of 1999 and policy initiatives by the Clinton Administration have balanced industry
attempts to liberalize the current encryption export regime with measures which
strengthen the power of local and federal law enforcement agencies to combat criminals.
131. See supra notes 97-99, 107-15 and accompanying text.
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In addition to reforming domestic encryption regulations, the United States needs to
foster closer international cooperation concerning encryption exports. The trend in re-
cent years is for countries to unilaterally pursue their own interests and export encryp-
tion products without regard to the security implications of their decisions. 132 Convinc-
ing the encryption-producing nations of the world of the need for a coordinated policy
which balances legitimate national economic interests with international security is ar-
guably the toughest challenge facing the United States today on this issue. The imple-
mentation of recent policy initiatives and legislation, however, would strengthen the
position of the United States in encouraging other nations to work within existing re-
gimes and in fostering their cooperation in creating a lasting encryption export regime.
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